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There has been a significant recent growth in the Social
Security Administration's Disability Insurance (DI) program,
both in the number of covered workers under the program andin
the amountofmonthly benefits. One possible factor causing
this growth has been labor supply disincentives under the pro-
gram. The laborsupplydecision by an individual involves the
effect of the disability benefit structure (potential benefits)
on labor force participation. Probit estimates from the 1969
original sample of the Longitudinal Retirement History Study
(LRHS) indicated anelasticityof participation with respect
to benefits of -.031 for married men aged 58—63, and—.023
for all men of the same age group. The magnitude of these
estimates are much less than those found by authors such as
Parsons, and suggest relatively insignificant efficiency
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(201) 648—5259I. Introduction
A major characteristic of the Social Security Administration's
Disability (DI) program has been the significant recent growth in the
program. The number of covered workers under DI increased from 59.6
million in 1954 to 98.7 million in 1973. Table 1 shows the large in-
crease from 1960—75 in the amount of monthly benefits. DI monthly
benefit payments in 1975 were over ten times what they were in 1960.
Disability is defined under the DI program as an inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically
determinable physical or mental condition that has lasted or is ex-
pected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months
or result in death.1 Since the definition of disability is both work
(and health) dependent, this focuses attention on the effectiveness of
labor supply incentives under the program.
If disability were an involuntary condition for the individual,
andifthe Disability Insurance program was truly screening only the
severely disabled, the labor supply issue would not be a factor. How-
ever, disability may be a voluntary condition for the individual. The
decision to become disabled maydependon factors such as declining
stamina and motivation, assets, andfamilycomposition. Also likely to
influencethe decision is the structure of the DI program, the net mar-
ket wage rate, the existence of private employer disability plans, and
the availability of alternative income maintenance plans. To the extent
that the availability of DI enters the laborsupplydecision of the—2—
TABLE1
SocialSecurity (OASDI) Disability Insurance and
Retirement Insurance Monthly Benefits in
Current Payment Status, 1960—1975
Disability Insurance Retirement Insurance









Source: Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 11,
November 1980.—3—
individual, the efficiency loss from adverse incentives must be balanced
against the equity gains from insurance coverage of the disabled. The
following section examines labor supply under the Disability Insurance
program.
II. Labor Supply Under Disability Insurance
In order to examine the effect of Social Security Disability Insur-
ance or labor supply, one must consider the program's benefit structure.
The primary elements of this structure are the basic monthly benefit
levels and the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) level which is the
level of earnings mandated by law beyond which point a medically un-
recovered individual would lose their benefits.
Figure 1 shows the budget constraint faced by the individual under
Disability Insurance. The potential beneficiary receives the basic
level of benefits (BEN). He or she may work without loss of benefits
up to $G1 of earnings which is the SGA level of K1 hours of work. At
this point, the benefit is in effect reduced dollar—for—dollar with
earnings along segment At the point G, where the person works K2
hours, they no longer receive disability benefits, and they operate
along segment GH outside of the DI system. The amount of market time
needed to earn depends on the individual's wage. The amount of
market time K2 needed to exhaust DI benefits depends on both wage and
benefit. We denote this version of the DI structure as the "hours
model," since the structure of the program is assumed to affect vary-
ing hours of work at low levels of work activity.
On the other hand, it may be the case that the SGA represents
such a low level of earnings that it may be considered to be—4—
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essentially zero to the individual. For example, the SGA level in 1974
was $200 per month, which for most persons would connote less than part—
time work. In Figure 1, any positive amount of market time would there-
fore lead to immediate loss of benefits. The budget constraint is DE
for zero hours of work, but immediately drops down to DR as soon as the
individual works a positive amount. The disability system is therefore
reduced to a labor force participation decision subject to benefits BEN
and market wage w. We denote this alternative form of the DI system as
the "participation model."
In the following discussion, we examine labor supply under the
"participation model." We do not discuss the hours model since the
supply decision from an empirical standpoint is basically a partici-
pation decision. Data from the 1969 sample of the Longitudinal Retire-
ment History Study (LRHS) shows that only .76 percent of males aged
58—63 who worked in 1968 worked at or above the SGA level.
III. Participation Model
The participation model under disability insurance can be repre-
sented by three equations: a shadow price equation, a wage equation,
and a labor supply equation.
We may specify the shadow price equation as
= + u1 (1)
and the market wage equation as:
w=c'x+U (2)—6—
with labor supply H specified as:
H S'z+y1w+132 if w.s (3)
(
0 if
where 112mayor may not equal (— 1i]) andH represents annual hours
worked.
The reduced form hours and wage equations from equations (l)—(3)
may be written as:
H.
Sj.z1
+ a!x1 +iu+ .2 Cl')
w. =a!x. +U (2')
11 1 0
where disability benefits would be expected to enter the vector z.
A priori, we would expect disability benefits to increase the value
of nonmarket time, therefore reducing the probability of working.
The conditional hours and wage equations for the population with
possible censored sampling become.
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In equations (4) and V1. andV2. are the conditional reduced
form disturbances, and A. is the inverse of Mill's ratio, which in re-
liability theory is knownasthe hazard rate.3
In order to estimate the extent of sample selection bias, we seek
consistent estimates of 4,. Consistent estimates of can be obtained
through probit analysis of the decision to work or not to work. Esti-
mates of 4, allows us to estimate A(4,.), which allows us to correct for
the fact that wages may be significantly higher for participants than
nonparticipants——a form of selectivity bias.
The general form of the structural participation equation can be
written as:
LFP =f(w,BEN, X) (7)
where w is the market wage, BEN is the level of potential disability
benefits, and X represents a vector of variables which are expected to
affect individual preferences between leisure and consumption goods——
such as family assets and productivity at home. We do not consider here
the case of fixed costs of working which affect the shadow price but
have a negligible effect on hours worked. Hausman (1979) has pointed
out the possible problems arising from the wage-shadow price approach
when fixed costs are present.4—8—
IV. Empirical Results
Tables 3 and 4 show maximum likelihood probit estimates of the
structural labor force participation equation for males aged 58—63
from the 1969 original sample of the Longitudinal Retirement History
Study (LRHS). These males were eligible for Disability Insurance
benefits based on their past earnings and employment covered by
Social Security.
Two variables are used which, in addition to entering the
shadow price equation, also standardize for the probability of
being certified as disabled by the Social Security Administration.
The first variable is LIMIT, which is adummy variableequal to one
if the individual is limitedingetting around,andzero otherwise.
This is a measure of the person's level of (poor) health, which is
an important criterion in being certified as disabled. We would
prefer a more lagged measure of health than LIMIT. This is because
a lagged measure would have a greater degree of exogeneity, and
would allow for the time period between onset of disability andthe
decision whether or not to apply for benefits and/or drop out of the
labor force. However, since we are using the 1969 original sample
which does not include retrospective health questions, we use the
variable LIMIT which partially reflects past health states.
The second variable used is UE, which is the numberofquarters
in the 40 quarters preceding 1968 in which the individual was not
credited with a quarter of coverage by the Social Security Adminis-
tration ($50 or more in wages in a calendar quarter or $100 or more
in self—employment income). Although the Social security Adminis-
tration does not specifically require a particular pattern of past—9—
TABLE2
Definition of Variables Used in Labor Force ParticipationEquations
Independent Variables
RURAL=dummyvariable equal to 1 if person resides in rural area
code, 0 if otherwise
MARRIED =dummyvariable equal to 1 if married, 0 otherwise
RACE =dummyvariable equal to if if black, 0 otherwise
LIMIT =dummyvariable equal to 1 if person limited in getting
around, 0 otherwise
EDUC =individual'syears of schooling completed
AGE =ageof individual
HHSIZE =numberof persons in household
BEN =potentialmonthly benefits from Social Security disability
insurance, given that the individual is eligible based on
their earnings records as of 1968
WAGE =hourlywage rate of individual in 1968
ASSETS =totalnet family assets in 1968
UE =numberof quartersin the 40—quarter period preceding 1968
in which the individual was not credited with a quarter
of coverage
KIDS=numberof children
SIBS =numberof brothersand sisters of individual
REDBEN =potentialmonthly reduced retirement benefits for those
aged 62—63
SPED=wife'syears of schooling completed
SPERN =wife'searnings in 1968
Dependent Variable
LFP =dummyvariable equal to 1 if worked more than zero hours
in 1968, 0 otherwise— 10—
TABLE2
Meanand Standard Deviation of Variables Used in
Participation Equations, Males Aged 58—63
Independent
Mean StandardDeviation
Total Married Total Married
Variables Sample Sample Sample Sample
RURAL .29 .30 .45 .46
MARRIED .90 1.0 .30 0
RACE .07 .066 .26 .25
LIMIT .23 .23 .42 .42
EDUC 10.0 10.1 3.6 3.6
AGE 60.3 60.3 1.7 1.7
RHSIZE 2.6 2.7 1.3 1.2
BEN 140.9 141.6 22.0 21.5
WAGE 4.8 4.8 3.5 3.6
ASSETS/100 51.8 54.8 127.0 132.1
UE 2.2 2.1 4.7 4.4
KIDS 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.2
SBIS 3.2 3.3 2.4 2.4
REDBEN 40.8 40.9 64.8 65.0




LFP .91 .91— 11—
TABLE3
MaximumLikelihoodProbit Estimates of LaborForceParticipation
Equation for Males Regardless of Marital Status Aged58—63
(N =4504,t—values in parentheses)







RURAL .07 .0007 .007 .00006
(1.0) (.01)
MARRIED .23 .20 .025 .017
(2.5)* (l.99)*
RACE —.043 —.14 —.005 —.012
(—.4) (—1.2)
LIMIT —1.2 —1.07 —.13 —.09
(_].9.l)**(_l6.2)**
EDUC .036 .047 .004 .004
(39)** (47)**
AGE —.14 —.15 —.015 —.013
(_4.6)**(.44)**
HHSIZE .022 .038 .002 .003
(.9) (1.3)
BEN .010 —.0017 .001 —.0001
(74)** (—1.1)
WAGE .004 .001 .0005 .0001
(.4) (.1)
ASSETS —.00001 .0001 —.000001 .000009
(—.04) (.3)












KIDS .009 .011 .001 .0010
(.6) (.7)
SIBS .008 .008 .0009 .0007
(.7) (.6)
REDBEN .0002 —.0001 .00002 —.00001
(.2) (—.2)







Denotessignificance at the 5 percent level.
**
Denotessignificance at the 1 percent level.— 13—
TABLE4
Maximum Likelihood ProbitEstimates of LaborForceParticipation
Equation for Married Males Aged 58—63









RURAL .08 —.008 .009 —.0006
(1.2) (—.1)
RACE —.06 —1.5 —.006 —.012
(—.5) (—1.2)
LIMIT —1.1 —1.04 —.11 —.082
(_17.3)** (_14.7)**
EDUC .028* .036 .003 .003
(2.5)* (2.95)**
AGE —.14 —.14 —.014 —.011
(_4.2)** (_3.8)**
HRSIZE .026 .04 .0026 .0031
(.9) (1.2)
BEN .009 .0026 .001 .0002
(6.4)** (—1.4)
WAGE .02 .022 .002 .0017
(1.4) (1.2)
ASSETS —.0002 —.00001 —.00002 —.000001
(—.5) (-.O4)












KIDS .023 .029 .0023 .0023
(1.4) (1.6)
SIBS .007 .0054 .0007 .0004
(.5) (.4)
REDBEN —.00009 —.0005 —.000009 —.00004
(—.1) (—.6)
SPERN .0015 .0029 .0002 .0002
(1.1) (1.95)
SPED .018 .018 .002 .001
(1.5) (1.4)







Denotessignificance at 5 percent level.
**
Denotessignificance at 1 percent level.— 15—
laborforce experience, the individual's preceding spells of unemploy-
ment and/or non—participation may be a factor in the certification
decision.
Wages and benefits are entered separately in the equation in
order to allow more flexibility in the functional form and in inter-
preting the results. Collinearity would not appear to be a problem
here, with the correlation between the wage rate and benefits being
approximately .13 for the sample.
The probit estimates in Tables 3 and 4 were done with non-
coverage of work under Social Security (UE) not included (column 1),
included (column 2). The results should be interpreted for the case
where tiE is included, assuming that tiE does not reflect a lagged value
of current labor force participation.5 Since UE is defined over the
past 40 quarters, this would reduce the likelihood that it is a lagged
value.
Table 3, column (2) shows estimates for males regardless of mari-
tal status. The coefficients on marital status (MARRIED) and years of
schooling completed (EDUC) are positive and significant. The proxy
for health (LIMIT), age (AGE), and past non—coverage of work (UE) have
coefficients which are negative and significant. The coefficients of
LIMIT and tiE indicate the expected effect of poor health and past pe-
riods of nonwork in discouraging participation as a result of a favor-
able shift in the probability of certification. The negative effect
of LIMIT also reflects the effect of poor health in raising the
shadow price.
It is also interesting to examine the coefficient on the race
dummy (RAcE). Although not highly significant, it is quite negative— 16—
(—.14).This is not in line with the result found by Parsons (1980b),
whereby the race coefficient became virtually zero when controlling
for disability benefits.
The coefficient for potential disability benefits (BEN) was
found to be —.0017, with a t—statistic of _i.i.6 The partial ef-
fect of benefits on labor force participation at the mean was —.0001,
with an elasticity of participation with respect to benefits of —.023.
The effect of benefits on participation found here is far smaller than
that found by Parsons (1980a,b). Parsons, in separate studies, found
elasticities of —.63 and —1.8 for middle—aged men.
Table 4, column (2) shows probit estimates for the subsample of
married men. Estimates for most of the variables were similar to those
found for the total (married and unmarried) sample. For the married
subsample, wife's schooling (SPED) and wife's earnings (SPERN) were
added. The coefficients on SPED and SPERN were positive although not
highly significant.
The coefficient on BEN was —.0026, with a t—statistic of -1.4.
This coefficient was slightly more negative than was the case for the
entire sample in Table 3. The greater negative valuation of disability
benefits for married men might reflect the availability of wife's
benefits, even when controlling for the wife's contribution to family
earnings (SPERN). The elasticity of participation with respect to
benefits at the means was —.031, still a great deal lower than Parson's
estimates.— 17—
v. clusion
We have examined one possible factorwhich hascontributedto the
signifjcan recent growth in the SocialSecurity Administration's Dis-
ability Insurance (DI) program: thatoflabor supply incentives under
the program.
The examination of laborsupply effects involved the effect of
thedisability benefit structure (potentialbenefits) on labor force
participation. A priori, it wasexpected that anincrease inpotential
benefits would increase the valueof time spent outside ofthe labor
market,and would therefore reduce theprobability ofworking.
Maximum likelihood probit estimates oflabor force participation
for males aged 58-63 in theLongitudinal Retirement History Study(LRHs)
indicated an elasticity ofparticipation with respect to benefits of
—.023 for all men, and anelasticity of —.031 for married men. The
magnitude of these elasticities were far lessthan those found by other
authors such as Parsons.
In interpreting these results froma social policy standpoint, a
few caveats should be noted. Theanalysis has ignored macroeconomic
factors such as the unemploymentrate. Also not considered have been
temporal aspects of the Disability Insuranceprogram such as the five-
month waiting period for receipt ofbenefits, the appeals process, and
changes over time in the disability laws.
The results obtained here dosuggest a mixed response to the ques—
tion as to whether the Social
Security disability system should be
altered, or (as is a topic of lively current
debate) significantly di-
minished. The labor supply effectssuggest relatively insignificant— 18—
efficiencylosses in terms of diminished work effort. These losses may
well be counter—balanced by equity gains from insurance coverage of the
disabledF-i
FOOTNOTES
1FromSocial Security Handbook, 1974.
2The individual actually loses all of their benefits atK1 hours
of work, which we are "averaging" as a dollar—for—dollar reduction
along segment FG. Alternatively, we could have modeled this as a sharp
drop in the budget line from point F down to the horizontal axis, and
then a resumption of slope w along a segment below segment DH.
3See Heckman (1976).
4Hausxnan (1979) points out that fixed costsmay lead to non—
convexities in the budget constraint faced by the worker because of
minimum labor supply conditions. These nonconvexities may cause
multiple tangencies of the indifference curve with the budget con-
straint, and cause the wage—shadow price approach to break down.
5Since the variable UE reflects past labor force experience, this
may be measuring to a certain extent lagged values of the labor force
participation dependent variable.
Taubman and Rosen (1980) have stressed the difference in inter-
pretation of results when the dependent variable represents a first
order difference from period t to period t +1, as opposed to a level
in period t.
Consider the case of the effect of disability insurance on labor
force participation. If UE represented lagged labor force participation,
the coefficient on BEN would represent the difference in slopes betweenF- 2
labor force participation "deterioration functions" where these functions
relate participation to time. On the other hand, to the extent that tiE
did not reflect lagged indicators of participation, the coefficients on
BEN would (in a cross—section) be measuring the difference in levels of
participation or the distance between deterioration functions at a given
point in time. For purposes of the analysis, participation is being
treated as a level.
6 interaction term LIMIT x BEN was added to the equation. The
coefficient, however, was positive and significant. This seems to in-
dicate that the interaction term is picking up a past wage effect as
opposed to a benefit effect.R- 1
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